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DoD has become increasingly dependent upon storing its sensitive informa-
tion in electronic form and has a deep concern for the integrity and privacy of
this valuable information. In the recent aftermath of numerous electronic
break-ins, the DoD continues to express anxiety over technically weak system
administrators' inability to protect sensitive electronic information.
The solution to minimizing these electronic intrusions and bolstering
computer security in DoD is to educate military officers and federal civilians
in the methods of computer security. This can be accomplished by integrating
concepts and problem solving techniques related to computer security into the
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. RATIONALE AND PURPOSE OF THESIS
In 1986, Cliff Stoll, an astronomer-turned-system administrator at
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, attracted international attention by tracing a
75 cent computer system accounting error to a West German hacker stealing
military documents and selling them to the KGB. Although the hacker was not
a brilliant programmer, he was persistent. By exploiting security deficiencies
in operating systems, lax password security, and poor system management,
the hacker managed to attack over 450 computers attached to MELNET,
successfully penetrating 30. The hacker persistently attacked computers
located at military bases, defense contractors, and universities, searching files
for keywords like KH-1 1, SDI, and NUCLEAR. [Ref. 1]
On the evening of November 2, 1988, Robert T. Morris, a Cornell
graduate student unleashed a worm on the Internet. Within hours
approximately 3,000 Sun and VAX workstations running variants of the
Berkeley Standard Distribution 4.3 UNIX operating system fell victim to the
worm. Although the worm, innocuous in the sense that it did not destroy files
or alter information, did however propagate uncontrollably, overwhelming
system resources. [Ref. 2]
Between April 1990 and May 1991, foreign hackers penetrated 34
Department of Defense (DoD) computers including one system that directly
supported Operation Desert Shield / Storm. The hackers gained access to
sensitive military computers by exploiting well known flaws in operating
systems, weaknesses in the Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) and
accounts with easily guessed passwords. [Ref. 3]
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DoD has become increasingly dependent upon storing its "sensitive
information" in electronic form and naturally there is a deep concern for the
integrity and privacy of this valuable information. In the aftermath of
numerous electronic intrusions, many questions have been raised regarding
the lack of computer security and the abundance of computer system
vulnerabilities.
One predominate factor linked to these "electronic break-ins" is
system administrators who are not formally educated in computer
security. Although highly publicized stories of "electronic break-ins",
worms, and viruses have made some system administrators more security
conscious, awareness of the problem is not enough. [Ref. 4]
The phenomenon of widespread electronic intrusion is very
recent. It is made possible by the proliferation of personal
computers and their connection to electronic networks. Although
technically sophisticated, intrusions are always the acts ofhuman
beings. Intrusions can be controlled by a combination of
technical safeguards - a sort of network immune system - and
hygienic procedures for using computers. But they cannot be
eliminated.
It would seem that some straightforward technological fixes
would greatly reduce future threats. But technological fixes are
not the final answer; they are valid only until someone launches
a new kind of attack. [Ref. 5]
The solution to minimizing these electronic intrusions and bolstering
computer security in DoD is to educate military officers and federal civilians
in the methods of computer security. This can be accomplished by integrating
concepts and problem solving techniques related to computer security into the
Information Technology Management (370) Curriculum at the Naval
Postgraduate School.
The following describes DoD's anxiety about system administrators'
inability to safeguard electronic information, and proposes several cost
efficient avenues to enhance the training of computer security in the
Information Technology Management (370) Curriculum. This thesis will also
serve as a computer security reference vehicle to facilitate faculty members in
modifying their courses to encompass relevant security issues.
B. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS
This thesis contains seven chapters and three appendices, the following is
a summary of the contents:
Chapter I Introduction acquaints the reader with three highly
publicized electronic break-ins and highlights DoD's anxiety about
technically weak system administrators' inability to protect sensitive
electronic information.
Chapter II Computer Security and DoD briefly describes what
computer security is and what it entails. Introduces two U.S. Government
Accounting Office (GAO) perceptions of system administrators, the current
"local" computer security climate, and the need for computer security
professionals.
Chapter III Cultivating Computer Security in DoD describes laws,
acts, and technical publications that directly impact computer security within
DoD. Proposes modifying an academic program at the Naval Postgraduate
School to ameliorate DoD's computer security problems.
Chapter IV Analysis Methods describes the procedures and resources
used in this thesis.
Chapter V Summary of Findings summarizes the thesis research
findings and the strengths and weaknesses of the current 370 Curriculum.
Chapter VI Recommendations describes in detail seven
recommendations for improving computer security.
Chapter VII Conclusion; opinions.
Appendix A Information Systems Courses reflects the comparison of IS
courses with the (ISC) information security certification format.
Appendix B Computer Science Courses reflects the comparison of CS
courses with the (ISC) information security certification format.
Appendix C Electro-Optical and Communication Courses reflects the
comparison of EO and CM courses with the (ISC) information security
certification format.
List of References lists the sources of information used.
II. COMPUTER SECURITY AND DOD
A. WHAT IS COMPUTER SECURITY?
In the aftermath of numerous "electronic break-ins" to sensitive
government computers, the DoD has become acutely aware of its computer
security inadequacies. In light of these recent events one must ponder the
question, what exactly is computer security and what does it entail?
Computer security is far more reaching than just protecting information
systems from "electronic break-ins".
Computer security is concerned with identifying
vulnerabilities in systems and in protecting against threats to
those systems....many computer users still don't really
understand what computer security is~and why it should be
important to them. Computer security protects your computer
and everything associated with it-your building, your terminals
and printers, your cabling, and your disks and tapes. Most
importantly, computer security protects the information you've
stored in your system. That's why computer security is often
called information security. [Ref. 6]
"Every computer system is vulnerable to attack". [Ref. 7] In order to
protect this valuable information, first determine where the system is
susceptible to intrusion, attack, or environmental danger. Once you have
discovered the system's vulnerabilities, appropriate preventative measures
can be taken. Typical areas of concern include:
• Physical Vulnerabilities: Your buildings, your computer site
and the associated peripherals are vulnerable. One of the primary
functions of physical security is to restrict unauthorized access to
the computer site and provide protection from damage caused by
natural disasters. "Physical security methods include old
fashioned locks and keys, as well as more advanced technologies
like smart cards and biometric devices."[Ref. 8]
• Natural Disasters, such as fire, floods, earthquakes, and other
dangers due to natural forces can cause irreparable damage to
computer equipment and even worse, a loss of valuable
information. Although natural disasters are not preventable, steps
can be taken to minimize the severity of the damage.
• Software Vulnerabilities: Worms, viruses, trapdoors, and even
simple bugs can open the system to electronic intruders.
• Human Vulnerabilities: "The people who administer and use
your computer system represent the greatest vulnerability of all.
The security of your entire system is often in the hands of a
systems administrator." If that administrator is not properly
trained or is unable to safeguard valuable electronic information,
the system could be exploited and subjected to electronic
terrorism or vandalism. [Ref. 9]
B. DOD'S INTEREST IN COMPUTER SECURITY
1. 1989 U.S. General Accounting Office Report
DoD has become increasingly dependent upon storing its "sensitive
information" in electronic form and naturally there is a deep concern for the
integrity and privacy of this valuable information.
Network intruders—some would call themselves explorers or
liberators—have found ways of using networks to dial into remote
computers, browse through their contents, and work their way
into other computers. They have become skilled at cracking the
password protocols that guard computers and adept at tricking
the operating systems into giving them superuser or system
manager privileges. They have also created worm and virus
programs that can carry out these actions unattended and
replicate themselves endlessly-electronic surrogates that can
prowl the network independent of their creators. As electronic
networking spreads around the globe, making possible new
international interactions and breaching barriers of language and
time, so rise the risks of damage to valuable information and the
anxiety over attack by intruders, worms, and viruses. [Ref. 10]
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Representative Edward J. Markey, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance (House Committee on Energy and
Commerce), recognizing the devastating impact a malicious "Internet type"
worm could have on DoD computers, asked the U.S. General Accounting
Office (GAO) to conduct an intensive investigation focusing on DoD's
inherent vulnerabilities regarding computer security. [Ref. 1 1]
Hackers have been accessing and continue to gain access to sensitive
networked DoD computer systems by exploiting system weaknesses. One of
the most prevalent weaknesses mentioned in the 1989 GAO report was
that host computer site system managers were technically weak and
practiced poor security management techniques. The report states:
Host computers are frequently administered by systems
managers, typically site personnel engaged in their own research,
who often serve as systems managers on a part-time basis.
A number of Internet users, as well as NCSC and Defense
Communications Agency virus reports, stated that the technical
abilities of systems managers vary widely, with many managers
poorly equipped to deal with security issues, such as the Internet
virus. For example, according to the NCSC report, many systems
managers lacked the technical expertise to understand that a virus
attacked their systems and had difficulty administering fixes.
The report recommended that standards be established and
a training program begun to upgrade systems manager
expertise. [Ref. 12]
2. 1991 U.S. General Accounting Office Report
On November 20, 1991 Jack L. Brock Jr., Director of Government
Information and Financial Management Issues (Information Management and
Technology Division) gave testimony before the members of the Senate
Subcommittee on the vulnerabilities of DoD computer systems penetrated
during Operation Desert Shield / Storm. Mr. Brock stated:
Hackers continue to successfully exploit security weaknesses
and undermine the integrity and confidentiality of sensitive
government information.
Between April 1990 and May 1991, computer systems at 34
DoD sites attached to the Internet were successfully penetrated
by foreign hackers. The hackers exploited well-known security
weaknesses—many of which were exploited in the past by other
hacker groups. These weaknesses persist because of the
inadequate attention to computer security, such as password
management, and the lack of technical expertise on the part of
some system administrators-persons responsible for the
technical management of the system.
At many of the sites the hackers had access to unclassified,
sensitive information on such topics as (1) military personnel-
personnel performance reports, travel information and personnel
reductions; (2) logistics—descriptions of the type and quantity of
equipment being moved: and (3) weapons systems development
data.
Although such information is unclassified, it can be highly
sensitive, particularly during times of international conflict.
Some DoD and government officials have expressed concern that
the aggregation of unclassified, sensitive information could
result in the compromise of classified information.
...system administration duties are generally part-time
duties and that administrators frequently have little
computer security background or training. [Ref. 13]
Both GAO reports express DoD's anxiety about system
administrators' lack of technical expertise and their inability to safeguard
electronic information.
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3. Computer Security Climate
To obtain a feel for the "local" computer security climate, interviews
were conducted with the System Administrator/Automated Data Processing
(ADP) Managers at two central California military installations to determine
their computer security backgrounds and training. Research revealed that the
system administrators received little if any formal education in the arena of
computer security. For example, one of the ADP Manager's entire formal
training consisted of a two day computer security course in San Francisco
[Ref. 14]. The other ADP Manager had not received any type of formal
computer security training to date [Ref. 15].
C. THE NEED FOR COMPUTER SECURITY PROFESSIONALS
It is imperative that the concepts and issues of computer security be
addressed if our goal is to protect the privacy, integrity and availability of
sensitive government information from forms of electronic vandalism and
terrorism. To accomplish this goal, attention must be focused on establishing
an education program that will provide system administrators with the
technical expertise to understand, administer, and make knowledgeable,
informed decisions with regard to computer security.
III. CULTIVATING COMPUTER SECURITY IN DOD
A. SECURITY RELATED LEGISLATION
Since the late 1950s, federal agencies have become increasingly
concerned over the protection of sensitive electronic information. This
concern has spawned numerous pieces of legislation aimed at security. Two
recent pieces of legislation, the National Telecommunication and Information
Systems Security Publication 200 (NTISSP 200) and the Computer Security
Act of 1987, have had a profound impact on the delegation of computer
security practices in DoD.
1. NTISSP 200
National Telecommunication and Information Systems
Security Publication 200 (National Policy on Controlled Access
Protection) defined a minimum level of protection for computer
systems operated by Executive branch agencies and departments
of the U.S. Government. The policy applies to any system
accessed by multiple users who do not all have the same
authorization to use all of the classified or sensitive unclassified
information processed or maintained by the system. NTISSP 200
stated that within five years of publication (i.e., by September of
1992), the systems affected by the policy must provide
automated Controlled Access Protection (CAP) for all classified
and sensitive unclassified information at the C2 level of trust
defined in the Orange Book. 1 [Ref. 16]
The Orange Book is a technical publication, part of the Rainbow Series
,
which defines trusted computer system evaluation criteria for systems
requiring multiple levels of security. There are four basic divisions of trust,
1. Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, Department of Defense Stan-
dard (DOD 5200.28-STD) Library Number S225J11, December 1985.
2. A series of technical computer security books published by the National Computer Security Center,
each with a different colored covering, hence the name "Rainbow Series"
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with each division further subdivided into one or more distinct classes. Each
class is denoted with a number, where the higher numbers indicate a greater
degree of security [Ref. 17]. In increasing order of trust, from lowest to
highest, the classes are:
D Minimal Protection
CI Discretionary Security Protection
C2 Controlled Access Protection




How do you rate each of the aforementioned classes, and what are the
associated requirements to achieve this rating?
Each class is defined by a specific set of criteria that a system
must met to be awarded a rating for that class. The criteria fall
into four general categories: security policy, accountability,
assurance, and documentation. [Ref. 18] Table 1 compares the
Orange Book evaluation classes, showing the specific features
required for each class and, in general terms, how requirements
increase from class to class. [Ref. 19]
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Table 1: TRUSTED COMPUTER SYSTEM EVALUATION CRITERIA
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New or enhanced requirements for this class
No additional requirements for this class
No requirements for this class
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2. Computer Security Act of 1987
The Computer Security Act of 1987 holds each federal agency
accountable for identifying computer systems that utilize sensitive data. The
act also requires civilian, military, government employees, and others who
directly interact with systems containing sensitive information to receive
computer security training commensurate with their level of access. [Ref. 9]
Since the government has over 50,000 sensitive systems, a new stock
of questions emerge. Who will train this multitude of individuals needed to
operate these systems, to what extent will they be trained, and how will their
computer security training benefit the DoD?
B. FORMAL COMPUTER SECURITY EDUCATION: TOWARD A
CERTIFICATION FORMAT
System administrators are chronically considered the weak link in
the computer security chain. Their lack of formal and technical education in
the arena of computer security is a dangerous situation, but this situation can
be rectified.
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California, an
institution dedicated to providing graduate level academic programs to meet
the increasing technological and professional needs of the DoD, offers a viable
solution. The Information Technology Management (370) Curriculum, an
eight quarter interdisciplinary program of study, is designed to provide
officers and federally employed civilians with a strong knowledge of
information systems, emphasizing computer and telecommunication systems.
With minor modifications and a moderate injection of computer security
concepts and issues, the Information Technology Management (370)
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Curriculum can become a beneficial vehicle for producing more
knowledgeable and competent computer security "professionals". The
modified curriculum can greatly contribute towards combating DoD's
computer security problems.
There are individuals in the computer industry who market themselves as
"security professionals", but without the sanction of any recognized certifying
group. A few certification programs lightly touch on security issues, but to
date, there is no certification program dedicated totally to the issues of
information security. [Ref. 20]
The International Information Systems Security Certification
Consortium- or (ISC) for short— was created to develop a
certification program for information systems security
practitioners. In November 1988, the Special Interest Group for
Computer Security (SIG-CS) of the Data Processing
Management Association (DPMA) brought together
organizations who were interested in creating a certification
program for this community of specialists. The cooperating
organizations include the Data Processing Management
Association (DPMA), Information Systems Security Association
(ISSA), Idaho State University, the National Security Agency
(NSA), and the Computer Security Institute (CSI). Other groups
-including the Canadian and U.S. Governments, the Canadian
Information Processing Society (CIPS), and the International
Federation for Information Processing (DFIO) have been
represented at meetings and have been invited to participate.
Representation from other interested and qualified bodies,
including IEEE and ACM, is under consideration. [Ref. 21]
In 1991 (ISC)2 proposed the first formal certification program for
computer security professionals. This certification reflects the current thought
and future expectations of distinguished experts in the computer security field.
[Ref. 22]
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By extracting the (ISC)2 certification format and injecting these concepts
and issues into the existing 370 Curriculum, a new, enhanced curriculum will
metamorphose. In this fast changing climate of high-technology, this
curriculum will ensure the military has an ample supply of these top-level




The purpose of this thesis is to determine if relevant computer security
concepts and issues were being addressed in the Information Technology
Management (370) Curriculum and make recommendations to improve
course content and the Curriculum. In order to determine which concepts and
issues were considered relevant and if they were being addressed, several
methods were employed:
• Literature review (including academic and DoD publications on
computer security).
• Interviews with DoD ADP Managers.
• Interviews with faculty from the Computer Science,
Administrative Sciences, and the Electrical and Computer
Engineering Departments.
• Micro analysis of the 370 Curriculum from the viewpoint of
computer security, utilizing the (ISC) certification format.
A. LITERATURE REVIEW
Initially, a comprehensive literature review was conducted to become
familiar with the current computer security atmosphere and to form a
knowledge base for further research. The computer library located in the
Naval Postgraduate School's Ingersoll Hall, is a cornucopia of computer
information. Some of the reference material utilized to assimilate information
for the knowledge base includes;
• Government Publications: The "Rainbow Series", Federal
Information Processing Standards Publications (FIPS PUBS)
and Government Accounting Office Reports (GAO)
• Electronic Newsgroups: altsecurity, comp.risks, comp.virus
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• Anonymous File Transfer Protocol (FTP): Several documents
were retrieved electronically from these addresses:
cert.sei.cmu.edu, cu.nih.gov, cs.purdue.edu.
• Computer Security Books: Computers under Attack: Intruders,
Worms and Viruses by Peter Denning, Security in Computing by
Charles Pfleeger, Computer Security Basics by Deborah Russell
and G.T. Gangemi Sr., and Computer Security Handbook by
Richard Baker.
• Computer Security Professional Certification Format:
International Information Systems Security Certification
Consortium (ISC)2 is the format used to evaluate each course in
the 370 Curriculum. The result of the evaluation is reflected in
Appendices A, B, and C.
Once the information from the literature review was assimilated, and a
through knowledge of computer security established. This newly gained
knowledge base, along with the (ISC)2 certification format was used as a tool
to interview NPS faculty members.
B. LOGICAL COURSE GROUPINGS
To analyze the 370 Curriculum, it was necessary to segregate the courses
into the following logical course groupings; Communications (CM),
Computer Science (CS), Electro-Optical (EO), Information Systems (IS),
Management (MN), Operations Science (OS), Mathematics (MA), and Naval
Science (NS). Research revealed the MN, OS, MA, and NS courses were
sufficiently devoid of the information applicable to computer security. Four
course groupings: IS, CS, CM and EO were selected for analysis because
they contained the bulk of the technical material in the 370 Curriculum and
relate to computer systems. Once the areas for analysis were selected, the
experts were interviewed.
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C. INTERVIEWS WITH NPS FACULTY
Faculty members representing the Computer Science, Administrative
Science, and the Electrical and Computer Engineering departments were
individually interviewed. Each interview revolved around four main issues:
• To what extent did the course address computer security
concepts and issues?
• If the concepts and issues were not addressed, how easy would
it be to incorporate the (ISC) format into the course?
• If the concepts and issues were addressed, how close did the
content adhere to the (ISC) format?
• If there were shortcomings in the amount of computer security
issues addressed, where could improvements be made?
Each emphasis area course within its respective department was reviewed
for computer security related concepts or issues. Faculty members were
encouraged to offer their opinions as to how the courses could be modified to
adhere to the (ISC)2 certification format.
D. INTERVIEWS WITH DOD ADP MANAGERS
Interviews were conducted with the System Administrator/Automated
Data Processing (ADP) Managers at two central California military
installations to determine their computer security backgrounds and training.
Interview questions focused on;
• Personal Education: Did the individual have any previous
computer experience, if so what type, and how much?
• Training: What type of computer security training had they
received? What actions were taken to increase the staff's
awareness of computer security? What type of guidance did they
receive (e.g. local instructions, Navy instructions, laws, etc.).
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What were their future plans to increase computer security and
computer security awareness at their site?
E. COURSE ANALYSES
Four logical course grouping areas of the 370 Curriculum; Information
Systems, Computer Science, Communications and Electro-Optical were
analyzed. Each course in the respective logical course grouping was
scrutinized for relevant computer security issues using the (ISC) certification
format as a cross-reference. Each course fell into one of three categories,
either the subject was addressed, the subject was not addressed but needs
to be, or the subject was not relevant to the course.
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V. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Both the 1989 and 1991 GAO reports discussed in chapter 2,express
DoD's anxiety about technically weak system administrator's inability to
protect sensitive electronic information. Both reports recommend a formal
training program be established to strenghten system administrator's
knowledge of computer security.
Interviews with local ADP managers support the GAO's findings that
system administrators receive little if any formal computer security training.
Although only a small portion of the ADP manager population was sampled,
it was evident that formal computer security training had not been a
prerequisite for the position.
Faculty interviews along with course analyses indicate only one course,
CS 4601 Computer Security, adheres closely to the (ISC)2 certification
format, and that computer security concepts and issues are sparse in other
courses of the 370 Curriculum. Of the 298 topic items identified by the (ISC)2
certification format, 165 items are addressed in CS 4601 Computer Security,
37 items are addressed in IS 4200 System Analysis and Design, 10 items are
addressed in CM 3112 Navy Telecommunications Systems, and 6 items in CS
2970 Structured Programming with Ada. Those courses that actually
addressed computer security concepts or issues are highlighted in the current
370 Curriculum matrix shown in Table 2.
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For a detailed analysis of how well each course paralleled the relevant
computer security concepts in (ISC)2 certification format see the following
appendices. [Ref. 20]
• APPENDIX A Information Systems Courses
• APPENDIX B Computer Science Courses
• APPENDIX C Electro-Optical and Communication Courses
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In order to help decipher the appendices, a small sample is provided in
Table 3.
Table 3: APPENDIX LEGEND























A. Development of a Security Program
1 . Reason for a organizational security management policy
a. Objectives




+2. Security plan |
3. Training a m
The concept or issue is currently addressed.
c The concept or issue is not currently addressed, but needs to be.
The concept or issue is not relevant to the course.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Research indicates that the current 370 Curriculum needs a moderate
injection of additional computer security topics to emulate the (ISC)2
certification format. Several recommendations for modifying the 370
Curriculum follow:
Recommendation 1 : Modify the 370 Curriculum to allow students
to specialize in a particular area of interest. The curriculum would be divided
into three subspecialty areas called "Emphasis Tracks" as follows:
• Computer Security Emphasis Track
• Telecommunications Networks Emphasis Track
• Information Resource Management Emphasis Track
Each "Emphasis Track" would have one or more mandatory required
courses and a variety of elective courses to choose from. The 370 Curriculum
currently provides only one elective choice for students. The flexibility of
being able to select from a variety of elective courses would allow the
individual to tailor the curriculum to their particular field of interest. To
promote this flexibility, two additional elective slots can be realized with the
elimination of MN 4125 (Managing Planned Changed in Complex
Organizations) and IS 3171 (Economic Evaluation of Informations Systems
II). Examples of each Emphasis Track are provided below:
a. Computer Security Emphasis Track
Required Courses:
IS 3220 - Computer Center Management
IS 4xxx - Risk Analysis and Disaster Recovery Planning
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Elective Courses:
CS 4602 - Advanced Computer Security
IS 3000 - Distributed Computer System
IS 3503 - Micro-Computer Networks
IS 4184 - Information Resource Management in DoN/DoD
IS 4186 - Knowledge-Based Systems and Artificial Intelligence
MN4125 - Managing Planned Change in Complex Organizations
OS 3404 - Man-Machine Interaction
b. Telecommunications Networks Emphasis Track
Required Course:
IS 3000 - Distributed Computer System
Elective Courses:
IS 3220 - Computer Center Management
IS 3503 - Micro-Computer Networks
IS 4 1 84 - Information Resource Management in DoN/DoD
IS 4xxx - Risk Analysis and Disaster Recovery Planning
MN 4125 - Managing Planned Change in Complex Organizations
OS 3404 - Man-Machine Interaction
c. Information Resource Management Emphasis Track
Required Courses:
IS 4184 - Information Resource Management in DoN/DoD
Elective Courses:
IS 3000 - Distributed Computer System
IS 3220 - Computer Center Management
3. IS 4xxx Risk Analysis and Disaster Recovery Planning is a course that would have to be developed.
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IS 3503 - Micro-Computer Networks
IS 4xxx - Risk Analysis and Disaster Recovery Planning
MN 4125 - Managing Planned Change in Complex Organizations
MN4105 - Management Policy
OS 3404 - Man-Machine Interaction
Recommendation 2 : Eliminate the IS 3171 (Economic Evaluation
of Informations Systems II), MN 3154 (Financial Management in the Armed
Forces), and MN 4125 (Managing Planned Changed in Complex
Organizations) courses from the 370 Curriculum and replace them with
emphasis track electives. Split the CS 3030 Computer Architecture and
Operating Systems course into two courses. One course would consist of
primarily computer architecture, CS 3010, and the other course would consist
primarily of operating systems, CS 3030.
The benefit of splitting the current CS 3030 Computer Architecture and
Operating Systems course into two separate course will allow the instructors
more time to present the material in greater detail as well as inject more
security related issues. The only benefit of not splitting CS 3030 is that it
would make room for a fourth Track Elective. Two curriculum matrices are
shown in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 reflects CS 3030 being split and Table 5
reflects CS 3030 not being split.
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Table 4: MATRIX WITH IS 3171, MN 3154, AND MN 4125













































































































Table 5: MATRIX WITH IS 3171, MN 3154 AND MN 4125 ELIMINATED AND
























































































Track Elective CS 4601 (4-0)
Computer Security

















Recommendation 3 : Establish an advanced computer security
course as an elective for those individuals desiring to gain expertise in
computer security. Academic objectives would include an understanding of:
the fundamental models involved in multilevel security.
• how the fundamental models used in multilevel security are
implemented in the design of a secure computer system.
• the advancements and limitations of computer security
27
technology in the areas of multilevel databases, networks and
distributed systems.
• the various roles encryption plays in the development of secure
network protocols and remote access control.
• the DoD requirements for trusted systems and the verification
process.
Recommendation 4 : Establish a Disaster Recovery and Planning
course IS 4xxx, which would include:
• current theoretical foundations for conducting risk analysis,
an introduction to automated assessment tools.
• an introduction to current guidelines and directives.
• analyses of case studies.
Recommendation 5 : Establish a computer security laboratory,
which would allow students to apply theoretical concepts. This lab would
include:
• quarantined systems which would allow students to experiment
with viruses without infecting other computers. Students could
monitor the life cycle of viruses along with evaluating different
anti-virus software packages.
• computers with communication software that would allow
students to gain experience using both private and public key
encryption protocols and permit them to conduct fundamental
penetration testing.
• TEMPEST equipment to monitor electronic emanations from
computer systems, peripherals, and conductors.
• a Honeywell Information System Secure Communications
Processor (SCOMP). The SCOMP is the only system to date that
has received an Al Orange Book security rating. The SCOMP
would provide students a vital research tool to explore multilevel
28
security issues.
• various biometric devices that measure human body
characteristics used in computer security such as: retinal patterns,
fingerprints, handprints, voice patterns, keystroke patterns, and
signature dynamics. The Naval Postgraduate School's
Operations Research Department has an excellent biometrics
laboratory which could be used as an annex of the computer
security laboratory.
Recommendation 5 : Provide adequate funding in order to support a
quarterly seminar program in which visiting specialists from both government
and civilian sectors could address students and faculty concerning new
technologies, products and policies.
Recommendation 6 : Restructure the IS 2000 Introduction to
Computer Management course to include high level coverage of material
delineated in the (ISC)2 certification format. This would expose new students
to the importance of computer security early in the curriculum and thereby
foster a basic understanding and appreciation of concepts that will be
introduced in subsequent courses.
Recommendation 7 : Use the Appendices A, B, and C as a computer
security reference to help guide faculty members in modifying their courses to
include relevant computer security topics.
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VII. CONCLUSION
DoD has become increasingly dependent upon storing its sensitive
information in electronic form and naturally there is a deep concern for the
integrity and privacy of this valuable information. In the recent aftermath of
numerous electronic break-ins, the DoD continues to express anxiety over
technically weak system administrators' inability to protect sensitive
electronic information.
A significant step in minimizing electronic intrusions and bolstering
computer security in DoD is to educate military officers and federal civilians
in the latest technology and administrative controls available to enhance
computer security. This can be accomplished by modifying the Information
Technology Management (370) Curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School
to adhere to the proposed recommendations.
In order to further enhance the Information Technology Management
(370) Curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School, and strengthen the
graduate's knowledge of computer security, it is imperative that the 370




Table 6: Information Systems Courses












A. Development of a Security Program
1 . Reason for a organizational security management policy
a. Objectives
1. Identify sensitive systems/data a






1. Written and communicated
2. Board of directors responsibility
3. DPMA model policy
c. Connectivity, organizational structure, and security
1 . Connectivity defined +
+
+
2. Effect on organizational structure
3. Security considerations
d. Plans
1. Human resource management B
2. Access control B
3. Data control B B
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COMPUTER SECURITY CONCEITS AND ISSUES











4. Labeling u I
5. Contingency plan D
6. Legal responsibilities D
e. Responsibilities
1 . Board of Directors




1 . Reason B
2. Typical contents Q + l




+ +3. Critical elements






Table 6: Information Systems Courses
























2. Acceptance of responsibility
F. Information Systems Audit
II. Risk Management
A. Asset Identification and Valuation
1. Processing valuation D D
2. Risk management team + +
3. Classification of assets a D
4. Subclassification of assets
a. People, skills, and procedures u a
b. Physical and environmental u a
BTTBc. Communications
d. Hardware U B^
e. Software + H
f. Data and information D H
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5. Determining values for assets







b. Purpose of assigning value to assets LL
c. How to measure assets values
d. Criticality and sensitivity
B B1. Criticality: business impact, revenue losses
embarrassment, legal problems
D B2. Sensitivity: privacy, trade secrets, planning
information, financial data
3. Sources MIS, users, senior management
4. Levels: military, national security, commercial
e. Asset valuation: standard accounting
f. Asset valuation: replacement value
g. Asset valuation: loss of availability
h. Asset valuation: estimating methods
6. Use of asset analysis results
a. Limitations
Q B1. Lack of data
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2. Interpretation a H
B. Threat and Exposure Assessment
D1 . Threats, vulnerabilities, and exposures denned




a. Properties of threats
b. Properties of assets














4. Sources of threat information




c. Past history +
d. Outside Sources U
5. Calculating exposures B
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III. Safeguards: Security and Control Measures
A. Overview of Safeguards
1. Common sense B
2. Types of controls: prevention, detection, reaction











f. Risk perception and communication
4. Components of EDP security
D
B
a. Administrative and organizational controls
b. Policies
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d. Physical and environmental security
e. Computer operations +
+f. Contingency planning
5. Components of EDP security: technical




B. Organizational and Administrative Controls
D1. Trade secrets, employee agreements, conflict of interest
2. Security policy













f. Mandatory and discretionary security
g- Accountability: identification, authentication, audit
3. Responsibility areas, System Security Officer
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c. Security clearance and citizenship
3. Professional certificates L
4. Working environment
a. Vacations and job rotation
b. Employee-management relations
c. Career path planning
d. Remuneration
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5. Access rights and privileges H
6. Prosecution for adverse actions B I
B7. Employee separation
~
D. Physical and Environmental Security
1. Site location and construction
a. Computer room considerations B E II
B Bb. Special microcomputer problems
2. Physical access
a. Access vs. security B D -





a. Spikes, surges, brownouts B D
B Bb. Costs of prevention/protection equipment
4. Air-conditioning D B I
5. Water exposures and problems a a I
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11. Document libraries and controls a
E. Computer Operations U





2. Separation of duties







1. Backups and procedures
a. Data a
b. Manuals and documentation a
c. Equipment a
1. Air conditioning a I
2. Uninterruptible power supply a I
2. Catastrophe planning
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a. Stages in a disaster H H
b. Planning and response teams
c. Testing plan - II
d. Communication of plan - II
3. Security and controls in off-site backup and facilities
4. Business and DP insurance -
5. Software escrow arrangements
IV. Safeguards : Security and Control Measures, Technical
A. Hackers and reality: Perception of Risk B
B. Communications and Electronic Exposures
1. Locus of attack
a. Terminals +
b. Hosts +
c. Front-end processors +
d. Gateways +
e. Links +
f. Switches (multiplexors, packet switching, etc.) +
g- Special problems with intelligent workstations U +
2. Types of attack
+a. Passive: disclosure; traffic analysis: add/remove nodes +
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Qb. Active: modiiiaition; insertion; deletion; replay +
3. Electronic





b. Outgoing: leakage +
c. Solutions: shielding +
4. Communications
a. Value-added communications +
b. exposures incoming: noise and interference +
c. Exposures outgoing: interception, replacement +
,
d. Solution: physical measures +
l
+
e. Solutions: encryption +
f. ISO OSI communications standards *
5. Network design
a. Design considerations
1 . Integration of countermeasures into network I
design: cryptographic checksum; time stamp;
Bell/LaPadula model
D2. Integration of countermeasures into protocol layers: +
link level encryption; end-to-end encryption
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1. Concept of trust I D
2. Degrees of trustworthiness m +
3. Trusted network base 1 E
4. Testing Si
5. Formal specification izy




B~l1. Definition (plaintext, ciphertext; encryption/decryption)
2. Public key and private key B IB
3. Key distribution fl
-
!
4. Link level, end-to-end D (ID
5. Block mode, cipher block chaining, stream ciphers BI H
(synchronous and self-synchronous)
+6. DES, RSA B IB




8. Advantages and disadvantages fll D
D. Software and Operating System Controls
1. Secure operating systems
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b. Concepts: capabilities, reference validations
1. Secure kernels
2. Reference validations and capabilities
c. Present guidelines and standards, trusted computer base - H




4. Economy of mechanisms
5. Naturalness (human factors)
6. Continuous protection
e. Common penetration methods and countermeasures
KB1. Trojan horse; virus; worm; salami; piggyback; •
deception; human compromise; etc.
+
1
2. Controls on changes; audit trails; program library; /
code comparison; checksums and encryption;
vaccines and antiviral agents; access control; etc.
2. Access control
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a. Discretionary access control
1 . Subjects and objects /
2. Access privileges ^
3. Granting/revoking of privileges /
4. Access control lists /
5. Capabilities, descriptors V
6. Supervisor states, rings, domains /
b. Non-discretionary access control
1 . Labels on subjects, objects •
2. Rules for reading, writing /
3. Software Controls: Development
a. The real problem: bugs QE /B
b. Software engineering principles: layering, modularity 'D
c. Structured methods
^ / D
d. Formal specification and verification
^
I D
e. Program library/librarian * B
f. Data dictionary as a control L « D
g. Conversion and implementation - * B
4. Software controls: Maintenance
a. Separation of duties + ' B
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Db. Testing controls /ar
c. Change control U / HI
5. Assurance
a. Integrity /H
b. Testing • BT
c. Specification/verification /H
d. Facility management *£H
e. Disaster/contingency ^H
f. Compliance/degree of trust /H
E. Database systems security
1. Overview
a. Review of basic concepts of information protection H
b. Role of information protection in database systems I H
2. Threats
a. Direct disclosure of data
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f. Covert disclosure of data +
3. Policy/mechanism
a. Policy versus mechanism
b. Access controls
1 . Access right and privileges
2. Access control policies
3. Granularity
4. Labels














1 . Trusted kernel
2. Trusted filter Q H
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d. Access control vs. integrity
e. Assurance
V. Legal Environment and Professionalism
A. Law and legislation
1. The underlying problem
+a. Theft, copying software, privacy
b. Fraud
c. Physical abuse
d. Misuse of information
e. Sabotage r
2. Laws as tools for computer security
D
~
a. Privacy laws and legislation




2. Trade secret law
3. Patent law
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4. Trademark law +
m









e. DPMA Model Computer Crime Bill
f. Computer crime legislation in other countries
3. Legislation as legal options to control computer crime
a. License agreements (consumer license agreements)
b. permanent license agreements
c. Intellectual property rights
d. Employee non-disclosure considerations
e. Contracts
1. Software development contracts
2. Legal aspects of software purchasing
_
3. Leasing contracts r
f. Warranties for software and hardware
4. Control of strategic materials
5. Fraud and crime prevention and detection
^
6. Investigation; evidentiary trial
B. Ethics and professionalism
+1. Ethical decision-making
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a. British Computer Society +
+b. North America: DPMA and ICCP
c. Canada: CIPS and DPMA
1. CIPS
2. DPMA Canada
d. Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
e. EDP Auditors Foundation
3. National Computer Security Center
4. National Bureau of Standards
5. Certificate in Data Processing(CPC); Certified Information
Systems Auditor (CISA)
VI. CICA Computer Control Guidelines
A. Accounting and auditing
1 . Computer Control Guidelines
a. Responsibility for Control
b. Information Systems Development and Acquisition
c. Information Systems Processing
d. Segregation of Incompatible Functions and Controls
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e. Application Controls Q
2. Information systems audit
+
a. Security review objectives r
b. Specific security controls
c. Security review process
d. Evidence accumulation
e. Evaluation of test results
f. Communication of control weaknesses
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Table 7: Computer Science Courses








A. Development of a Security Program
1. Reason for a organizational security management policy
a. Objectives
1. Identify sensitive systems/data m
2. Security plan m
3. Training m
b. Policies
1. Written and communicated
2. Board of directors responsibility
3. DPMA model policy
c. Connectivity, organizational structure, and security
1. Connectivity defined
2. Effect on organizational structure
3. Security considerations
d. Plans
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1. Board of Directors




1 . Reason I
2. Typical contents /
3. Main purposes ^
C. Contingency Planning
1 . Defined y
2. Backup •
3. Critical elements 1
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5. Trade secrets m
H6. Employee agreements
E. System Validation & Verification (Accreditation)
1. Plan testing
2. Acceptance of responsibility m
F. Information Systems Audit
II. Risk Management
A. Asset Identification and Valuation
1. Processing valuation
2. Risk management team
3. Classification of assets
4. Subclassification of assets
a. People, skills, and procedures




f. Data and information
54
Table 7: Computer Science Courses








5. Determining values for assets
a. Acquired and intrinsic values /
b. Purpose of assigning value to assets m
c. How to measure assets values [/
d. Criticality and sensitivity
1. Criticality: business impact, revenue losses
embarrassment, legal problems
2. Sensitivity: privacy, trade secrets, planning
information, financial data
3. Sources MIS, users, senior management
4. Levels: military, national security, commercial
e. Asset valuation: standard accounting m
f. Asset valuation: replacement value
g. Asset valuation: loss of availability
h. Asset valuation: estimating methods
6. Use of asset analysis results
a. Limitations
1. Lack of data
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COMPUTER SECURITY CONCEPTS AND ISSUES
2. Interpretation /
B. Threat and Exposure Assessment
1 . Threats, vulnerabilities, and exposures defined /
2. Methodologies for threat assessment
a. Properties of threats
b. Properties of assets
c. Combining properties: the cost exposure matrix
3. Probability concepts
a. Definitions &












5. Calculating exposures $
56
Table 7: Computer Science Courses











ID. Safeguards: Security and Control Measures
A. Overview of Safeguards
1. Common sense / /
2. Types of controls: prevention, detection, reaction











f. Risk perception and communication
4. Components of EDP security
a. Administrative and organizational controls
b. Policies
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d. Physical and environmental security m
e. Computer operations 1
f. Contingency planning
5. Components of EDP security: technical




B. Organizational and Administrative Controls
1 . Trade secrets, employee agreements, conflict of interest m
2. Security policy
a. Intent (related to sensitivity)




f. Mandatory and discretionary security
g. Accountability: identification, authentication, audit
3. Responsibility areas, System Security Officer
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1. Human motives for criminal action I
2. Employee selection
a. Application forms
b. Permissions for investigations
c. Security clearance and citizenship
3. Professional certificates
4. Working environment
a. Vacations and job rotation
b. Employee-management relations
c. Career path planning
d. Remuneration
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5. Access rights and privileges ;/
6. Prosecution for adverse actions
7. Employee separation
D. Physical and Environmental Security
1. Site location and construction
a. Computer room considerations
b. Special microcomputer problems
2. Physical access
a. Access vs. security
b. Rooms, windows, doors, keys /
3. Power
a. Spikes, surges, brownouts
b. Costs of prevention/protection equipment
4. Air-conditioning '"
5. Water exposures and problems i
6. Fire prevention I
7. Fire protection
8. Tape and media libraries; retention policies J
9. Waste disposal 1
10. Off-site storage 1
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1 1 . Document libraries and controls §
E. Computer Operations




2. Separation of duties
3. Controls at interfaces
4. Media controls
5. Backup procedures n
6. People controls
F. Contingency Planning
1 . Backups and procedures
a. Data im
b. Manuals and documentation m
c. Equipment
1. Air conditioning
2. Uninterruptible power supply
2. Catastrophe planning
61
Table 7: Computer Science Courses






a. Stages in a disaster J
b. Planning and response teams I
c. Testing plan I
d. Communication of plan 1
3. Security and controls in off-site backup and facilities m
4. Business and DP insurance 1
5. Software escrow arrangements
IV. Safeguards: Security and Control Measures, Technical
A. Hackers and reality: Perception of Risk m
B. Communications and Electronic Exposures






f. Switches (multiplexors, packet switching, etc.)
g. Special problems with intelligent workstations
2. Types of attack
a. Passive: disclosure; traffic analysis; add/remove nodes 1
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b. Active: modification; insertion; deletion; replay /
3. Electronic
a. Incoming: interruptions; static: FRI; EMP /
b. Outgoing: leakage f/
c. Solutions: shielding m
4. Communications
a. Value-added communications
b. exposures incoming: noise and interference
c. Exposures outgoing: interception, replacement
d. Solution: physical measures
e. Solutions: encryption
f. ISO OS I communications standards
5. Network design
a. Design considerations
1. Integration of countermeasures into network
design: cryptographic checksum; time stamp;
Bell/LaPadula model
2. Integration of countermeasures into protocol layers:
link level encryption; end-to-end encryption
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COMPUTER SECURITY CONCEPTS AND ISSUES
b. Assurance
lc/5
1. Concept of trust
2. Degrees of trustworthiness





1. Definition (plaintext, ciphertext; encryption/decryption) 1
i2. Public key and private key
m3. Key distribution
4. Link level, end-to-end m
II5. Block mode, cipher block chaining, stream ciphers
(synchronous and self-synchronous)
6. DES, RSA
7. Cryptanalysis and strength of ciphers (theoretically secure
computationally secure)
8. Advantages and disadvantages
D. Software and Operating System Controls
1 . Secure operating systems
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COMPUTER SECURITY CONCEPTS AND ISSUES
a. History /
b. Concepts: capabilities, reference validations
H1. Secure kernels
2. Reference validations and capabilities [7
nc. Present guidelines and standards, trusted computer base




4. Economy of mechanisms
5. Naturalness (human factors)
6. Continuous protection
e. Common penetration methods and countermeasures
1. Trojan horse; virus; worm; salami; piggyback;
deception; human compromise; etc.
2. Controls on changes; audit trails; program library;
code comparison; checksums and encryption;
vaccines and antiviral agents; access control; etc.
2. Access control
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COMPUTER SECURITY CONCEPTS AND ISSUES
a. Discretionary access control
1 . Subjects and objects
2. Access privileges
3. Granting/revoking of privileges
4. Access control lists
5. Capabilities, descriptors
6. Supervisor states, rings, domains
b. Non-discretionary access control
1 . Labels on subjects, objects
2. Rules for reading, writing
3. Software Controls: Development
a. The real problem: bugs
b. Software engineering principles: layering, modularity
c. Structured methods
d. Formal specification and verification
e. Program library/librarian
f. Data dictionary as a control
g. Conversion and implementation
1
a
4. Software controls: Maintenance
a. Separation of duties
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f. Compliance/degree of trust
E. Database systems security
1. Overview
a. Review of basic concepts of information protection I
b. Role of information protection in database systems I
2. Threats
a. Direct disclosure of data i
b. Modification of data/tampering with data 3£8
c. Inference i
d. Aggregation m
e. Trojan horse m
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f. Covert disclosure of data /
3. Policy/mechanism
a. Policy versus mechanism
b. Access controls
1 . Access right and privileges 1
2. Access control policies
3. Granularity
4. Labels
5. Access control mechanisms S;
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d. Access control vs. integrity m
e. Assurance
V. Legal Environment and Professionalism
A. Law and legislation
1 . The underlying problem
a. Theft, copying software, privacy I
b. Fraud
c. Physical abuse
d. Misuse of information
e. Sabotage
2. Laws as tools for computer security
a. Privacy laws and legislation i
b. Intellectual property laws
1. Copyright law w&
2. Trade secret law
3. Patent law M
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4. Trademark law /
c. Federal laws (esp. Computer Security Act 1987) 1
d. State statutes
e. DPMA Model Computer Crime Bill
f. Computer crime legislation in other countries
3. Legislation as legal options to control computer crime
a. License agreements (consumer license agreements) i
b. permanent license agreements m
c. Intellectual property rights 1
d. Employee non-disclosure considerations
e. Contracts
1. Software development contracts
2. Legal aspects of software purchasing
3. Leasing contracts
f. Warranties for software and hardware
4. Control of strategic materials
5. Fraud and crime prevention and detection
6. Investigation; evidentiary trial
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a. British Computer Society
b. North America: DPMA and ICCP
c. Canada: CIPS and DPMA
1. CIPS
2. DPMA Canada
d. Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
e. EDP Auditors Foundation
3. National Computer Security Center 1
4. National Bureau of Standards M
5. Certificate in Data Processing(CPC); Certified Information
Systems Auditor(CISA)
VI. OCA Computer Control Guidelines
A. Accounting and auditing
1 . Computer Control Guidelines
a. Responsibility for Control
b. Information Systems Development and Acquisition
c. Information Systems Processing
d. Segregation of Incompatible Functions and Controls
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2. Information systems audit
a. Security review objectives /
b. Specific security controls /
c. Security review process /
d. Evidence accumulation I
e. Evaluation of test results •
f. Communication of control weaknesses
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Table 8: Electro-Optical and Communication Courses







A. Development of a Security Program
1. Reason for a organizational security management policy
a. Objectives




1. Written and communicated
2. Board of directors responsibility
3. DPMA model policy
c. Connectivity, organizational structure, and security
1. Connectivity denned
2. Effect on organizational structure
3. Security considerations
d. Plans
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1 . Board of Directors
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E. System Validation & Verification (Accreditation)
1. Plan testing
2. Acceptance of responsibility
F. Information Systems Audit
II. Risk Management
A. Asset Identification and Valuation
1. Processing valuation
2. Risk management team
3. Classification of assets
4. Subclassification of assets
a. People, skills, and procedures




f. Data and information
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5. Determining values for assets
a. Acquired and intrinsic values
b. Purpose of assigning value to assets
c. How to measure assets values
d. Criticality and sensitivity
1. Criticality: business impact, revenue losses
embarrassment, legal problems
2. Sensitivity: privacy, trade secrets, planning
information, financial data
3. Sources MIS, users, senior management
4. Levels: military, national security, commercial
e. Asset valuation: standard accounting
f. Asset valuation: replacement value
g. Asset valuation: loss of availability
h. Asset valuation: estimating methods
6. Use of asset analysis results
a. Limitations
1. Lack of data
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B. Threat and Exposure Assessment
1. Threats, vulnerabilities, and exposures defined
2. Methodologies for threat assessment
a. Properties of threats
b. Properties of assets
c. Combining properties: the cost exposure matrix
3. Probability concepts
a. Definitions
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III. Safeguards: Security and Control Measures
A. Overview of Safeguards
D1. Common sense I
2. Types of controls: prevention, detection, reaction













f. Risk perception and communication
4. Components of EDP security
a. Administrative and organizational controls
b. Policies
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d. Physical and environmental security
e. Computer operations
f. Contingency planning
5. Components of EDP security: technical




B. Organizational and Administrative Controls
1 . Trade secrets, employee agreements, conflict of interest
2. Security policy
a. Intent (related to sensitivity)




f. Mandatory and discretionary security
g. Accountability: identification, authentication, audit
3. Responsibility areas. System Security Officer
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b. Permissions for investigations
c. Security clearance and citizenship
3. Professional certificates
4. Working environment
a. Vacations and job rotation
b. Employee-management relations
c. Career path planning
d. Remuneration
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5. Access rights and privileges
6. Prosecution for adverse actions
7. Employee separation
D. Physical and Environmental Security
1. Site location and construction
a. Computer room considerations
b. Special microcomputer problems
2. Physical access
a. Access vs. security
b. Rooms, windows, doors, keys
3. Power
a. Spikes, surges, brownouts
b. Costs of prevention/protection equipment
4. Air-conditioning
5. Water exposures and problems
6. Fire prevention
7. Fire protection
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1 1 . Document libraries and controls
E. Computer Operations




2. Separation of duties






. Backups and procedures
a. Data
b. Manuals and documentation
c. Equipment
1. Air conditioning
2. Uninterruptible power supply
2. Catastrophe planning
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a. Stages in a disaster
b. Planning and response teams
c. Testing plan
d. Communication of plan
3. Security and controls in off-site backup and facilities
4. Business and DP insurance
5. Software escrow arrangements
IV. Safeguards: Security and Control Measures, Technical
A. Hackers and reality: Perception of Risk i
B. Communications and Electronic Exposures
1 . Locus of attack
a. Terminals
b. Hosts B
c. Front-end processors + +
d. Gateways
e. Links + +
f. Switches (multiplexors, packet switching, etc.)
g. Special problems with intelligent workstations
2. Types of attack
a. Passive: disclosure; traffic analysis; add/remove nodes
83
Table 8: Electro-Optical and Communication Courses














a. Incoming: interruptions; static; FRI; EMP m
b. Outgoing: leakage m
c. Solutions: shielding i
4. Communications
a. Value-added communications B
b. exposures incoming: noise and interference
Bc. Exposures outgoing: interception, replacement 11
d. Solution: physical measures +M +
Be. Solutions: encryption I
f. ISO OSI communications standards
5. Network design
a. Design considerations
1 . Integration of countermeasures into network +
design: cryptographic checksum; time stamp;
Bell/LaPadula model
2. Integration of countermeasures into protocol layers: +
link level encryption; end-to-end encryption
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1. Concept of trust
2. Degrees of trustworthiness





a1. Definition (plaintext, ciphertext; encryption/decryption) §
2. Public key and private key
Bl
3. Key distribution
4. Link level, end-to-end B
5. Block mode, cipher block chaining, stream ciphers
(synchronous and self-synchronous)
6. DES, RSA
D7. Cryptanalysis and strength of ciphers (theoretically secure mm
computationally secure)
Q8. Advantages and disadvantages I
D. Software and Operating System Controls
1. Secure operating systems
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b. Concepts: capabilities, reference validations
1. Secure kernels
2. Reference validations and capabilities
c. Present guidelines and standards, trusted computer base
d. Design principles fro secure systems
1 . Least privilege
2. Open design
3. Fail-safe defaults
4. Economy of mechanisms
5. Naturalness (human factors)
6. Continuous protection
e. Common penetration methods and countermeasures
1. Trojan horse; virus; worm; salami; piggyback;
deception; human compromise; etc.
2. Controls on changes; audit trails; program library;
code comparison; checksums and encryption;
vaccines and antiviral agents; access control; etc.
2. Access control
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a. Discretionary access control
1. Subjects and objects
2. Access privileges
3. Granting/revoking of privileges
4. Access control lists
5. Capabilities, descriptors
6. Supervisor states, rings, domains
b. Non-discretionary access control
1. Labels on subjects, objects
2. Rules for reading, writing
3. Software Controls: Development
a. The real problem: bugs
b. Software engineering principles: layering, modularity
c. Structured methods
d. Formal specification and verification
e. Program library/librarian
f. Data dictionary as a control
g. Conversion and implementation
4. Software controls: Maintenance
a. Separation of duties
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f. Compliance/degree of trust
E. Database systems security
1. Overview
a. Review of basic concepts of information protection
b. Role of information protection in database systems
2. Threats
a. Direct disclosure of data
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f. Covert disclosure of data
3. Policy/mechanism
a. Policy versus mechanism
b. Access controls
1. Access right and privileges
2. Access control policies
3. Granularity
4. Labels










1 . Trusted kernel
2. Trusted filter
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d. Access control vs. integrity
e. Assurance
V. Legal Environment and Professionalism
A. Law and legislation
1. The underlying problem
a. Theft, copying software, privacy
b. Fraud
c. Physical abuse
d. Misuse of information
e. Sabotage
2. Laws as tools for computer security
a. Privacy laws and legislation
b. Intellectual property laws
1. Copyright law
2. Trade secret law
3. Patent law
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c. Federal laws (esp. Computer Security Act 1987)
d. State statutes
e. DPMA Model Computer Crime Bill
f. Computer crime legislation in other countries
3. Legislation as legal options to control computer crime
a. License agreements (consumer license agreements)
b. permanent license agreements
c. Intellectual property rights
d. Employee non-disclosure considerations
e. Contracts
1. Software development contracts
2. Legal aspects of software purchasing
3. Leasing contracts
f. Warranties for software and hardware
4. Control of strategic materials
5. Fraud and crime prevention and detection
6. Investigation; evidentiary trial
B. Ethics and professionalism
1. Ethical decision-making
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a. British Computer Society
b. North America: DPMA and ICCP
c. Canada: CIPS and DPMA
1. CIPS
2. DPMA Canada
d. Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
e. EDP Auditors Foundation
3. National Computer Security Center
4. National Bureau of Standards
5. Certificate in Data Processing(CPC); Certified Information
Systems Auditor(CISA)
VI. CICA Computer Control Guidelines
A. Accounting and auditing
1 . Computer Control Guidelines
a. Responsibility for Control
b. Information Systems Development and Acquisition
c. Information Systems Processing
d. Segregation of Incompatible Functions and Controls
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2. Information systems audit
a. Security review objectives
b. Specific security controls
c. Security review process
d. Evidence accumulation
e. Evaluation of test results
f. Communication of control weaknesses
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